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The Media in American and German History from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century

Edited by
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and
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Radio Days: Did Radio Change Social Life in Germany and the United States?

Inge Marszolek

Back in the 1970s, Freddy Mercury wrote his radio reminiscence that became one of Queen’s Classics, titled Radio Ga Ga. It was aired and listened to on both sides of the Atlantic. In this song, Mercury describes himself as a lonesome boy, watching the device’s light and listening to the radio tunes during the nights, the radio being his only friend and only connection to the outer world. At that time radio was, on one hand, a nostalgic medium being superseded by television as the new leading mass medium. On the other hand, it played a central role in propagating the music that was so important for the shaping of the rebellious youth cultures of this period.

Already at this point it is clear that the question above is a rhetorical one. The answer is obvious. Yes, radio did shape everyday life in both societies. The image of the lonely listener, sitting in front of the apparatus, perhaps staring at the light controls of the receiver, may suggest a wrong way of how radio penetrated into social life, hiding the complex net of politics, economy and technology. Here we need some more investigative work. As Freddy Mercury’s song shows, radio users often produce a different narrative. To refer to Michel de Certeau, we have to understand the process of appropriation as social practice: “Diese ist listenreich und verstreut, aber sie breitet sich überall aus, lautlos und fast unsichtbar, denn sie äußert sich nicht durch eigene Produkte, sondern in der Umgangsweise mit den Produkten, die von einer herrschenden ökonomischen Ordnung aufgezwungen werden.”

A history of the radio must do more than merely describe the adaptations of the media to the ongoing changes in culture and politics. The political situation after World War I with its dramatic social and political disruptions was crucial for the emergence of the radio as a hyper-national media, as Michele Hilmes points out. Thus the potential of the radio as an instrument in the nation-building process was very much welcome by
all governments. We have to write the history of the radio by focusing on the frame behind the medium itself, understanding the medium in its complexity, seeing the apparatus as well as the user, the discourses shaping and shaped by the power structure as well as the grammar of the public and the private spheres.

How to Establish a Comparative Design in Media History

First of all I would like to share some methodological reflections concerning historical media studies in general and the comparative design in my paper. Looking just at political history, the differences between the German and the American case are overwhelming. In Germany from 1920 to the 1950s we are dealing with two democratic and two dictatorial systems, one short period of Allied occupation, not to mention World War II and the Holocaust as well as the Cold War and its impact on both Germanies after the war. In the United States we are speaking about different presidents, different policies, but of course of one democratic system. Even from the perspective of the organization of broadcasting in Germany and in the United States again the differences come to mind. From its beginnings, radio in Germany was a public medium, although in the 1920s, very much embedded in governmental policies, it became a propaganda tool for both dictatorships and a public radio again in the Federal Republic. In the United States, broadcasting became central in establishing the consumerist society and was thus organized along the demands of the market. Of course the history of the radio in Germany has to tell the story of catching up with the technology as well as the distribution and the programming of broadcasting in the United States and Great Britain. The gap became very significant after World War II, as in the United States television had already taken over, whereas in Germany this was only the case at the end of the 1950s (West) and in the beginning of the 1960s (East), but at a closer look, similarities emerge and the political disruptions seem to have had less of an effect on the media itself and the ways in which radio was consumed.

Being a global player, radio was always discussed in its potential to cross all borders, (this is true as well for the telegraph as for the television). Despite this, media history still remains caught in national contexts. I think that the time has come to open the fields for cross-national media history. However, seeing the thrilling aspects of this new field of media history, one has to cope with many difficulties. Comparative history has up to now limited itself to comparing what I call the solid facts, for example, the different institutions, the power structures, the decision-making processes in two or more systems. For a comparative analysis in the media field, this would mean restricting the analysis to the building of the institutions, the impact of the government on radio, the dissemination of the radio sets, and so forth. Even though this sort of comparison would have to cope, in the German and American cases, with difficulties concerning the differences described above, not to mention the different levels of research, I suggest an approach which concentrates on the complexity of the media itself, focusing on the organization, the technology, the programming as well as on the consumer practices and routines. In doing so, I would like to draw on two different methodological streams in media studies.

Anglo-American cultural studies and media ethnologists have enhanced the role of the consumer: Media messages can be decoded only if the consumers are familiar with their central symbols and patterns from their own experiences in their everyday life. Decoding these messages happens in an individual, sometimes even subversive way. The German media historian, Knut Hickethier, has suggested we understand the radio as a dispositif, following the French film theorists with their descriptions focusing on the relations between subjects and devices. Hickethier emphasizes the importance of the listeners’ experiences in interaction with radio technology and programming, referring to the understanding of the idea of a dispositif as developed by Foucault, which allowed Foucault to link the discourses to social practices and the power structures. This is the way in which he describes the anatomy of power. Hickethier underlines that the socialization of the electronic mass media is written into the apparatus. French film theorists, namely Jean Louis Baudry, have developed the triangle apparatus – spectator – program, establishing the subject as part of the dispositif, thus allowing us, as Michaela Hampf describes in her comment, to improve our knowledge of the often neglected consumer practices: because the content of the program depends on the apparatus as well as on the context of its use, regarding the dispositif may empower us to understand the approbation logics of the media consumer. Foucault himself defines the dispositif as a heterogeneous ensemble containing discourses, institutions, buildings, controlling decisions, laws, scientific statements and so forth. Focusing on the dispositif genealogy of technology, program and listener/spectator, we can analyse the perception of the media as well as its societal configurations.
Based on these preliminary remarks I suggest the following framework. Whereas Cultural Studies were sometimes prone to underestimate the impacts of the industry and the state, or neglected the importance of social or cultural capital for the consumer practices, preferring a model of soft hegemony, Foucault thinks of the dispositif as an integral part of the power system. Stressing the radio as a producer and distributor of discourses, the perceptions, imageries and the ways in which they define cultural production, come into view. Thus the practices of politics become central to the analysis. The emergence of radio was accompanied by debates about the mass subject and the blurring of the borders between private and public spheres. These debates are going on and lead us to rethink our understanding of private and public which includes our recurrence to a liberal bourgeois notion of the public sphere by neglecting the inherent contradiction to the mass-mediated public. Focusing on the discursive fields in which the radio fuels, produces and transmits discourses, and thus plays an active part in the structure of the microphysics of power, we might gain some clues, which may shed new light on these debates.

A discursive approach to the audiences might bridge the gap between the audiences invented by the media, by the politicians, and so forth, and the interactions between the listeners and the media. By decoding the media messages, new meanings are produced. These may be integrated into partial discourses or even create new ones, which shape the hegemonic discourses as well as the social practices. So again, the power structures come into view. The notion of the dispositif as an ensemble, mapping the technology, the device, the programming, and the listening in a discursive field, opens up the comparative frame and makes the coordinates flexible. In this understanding, the comparison may even contain discursive fields for one case, which do not exist or are less dominant in the other case. In the following I will try to unfold my comparative analysis along these methodological remarks. Considering the many blind spots on the map of radio history in Germany — the situation in the States seems much better — the risks of a cross-national analysis, and the limitations of an article, I see myself on a very slippery slope.

The Emergence of the New Media: The Organization of the Broadcasting System

Wireless communication was developed before World War I and achieved its technological perfection through the research and development efforts of the military industry: in both countries radio broadcasting started after the war and has to be clearly distinguished as a new medium. The first radio transmissions — in the United States in November 1920, in Germany in October 1923, were only three years apart, but the differences in the development of broadcasting were significant.

First of all, although further research still has to be done for the German side, the linkages between the wireless technology and early broadcasting in the United States are much stronger than in Germany. Early wireless technology was widely spread in the United States, where all over the nation thousands of amateurs, mostly schoolboys, were experimenting with the new technology. Unlike in all other countries, regulations came only as a reaction to the collision of two ships, in which wireless communication played a central role in saving lives, and was enforced after the catastrophe of the Titanic, when Congress passed the Radio Act in 1912. During the war it became crucial for the navy to gain control of the airwaves. Yet after the war, Congress was eager to roll back the wartime federal powers, but at the same time gain an important role for America in the development of radio communication technology. Thus the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) was founded, and it was the RCA that saw the potential of the radio becoming a “household utility” like the piano and the phonograph. Other companies joined in order to explore the future of the “radio music boxes”. Thus the model for organizing the radio was the wireless telegraph, with free access to the airwaves, orientated along both the needs of the amateurs as well as the interests of the highly competitive selling industries.

The first transmission was on 4 November 1920, reporting on the Harding-Cox presidential election by the Westinghouse Company. Yet this transmission did not seem very spectacular: it was not even mentioned by the New York Times. This is significant for the early perception of radio, which was not perceived as a new medium. Only when at the end of 1921 the industry could supply the customers with sufficient radio sets, the number of radio stations exploded. In the period between 1922 and 1936, many of the fledgling radio stations were ill equipped and undercapitalized. The market was swamped by the demand for radio devices.
As with the telegraph, listeners demanded some sort of regulation because of interference from stations, which was hampering the quality of reception and the programs. This made the need to establish a certain control of the airwaves obvious. Again, although the debates circled around government-controlled radio to paid broadcasting—which would be achieved by granting temporary licenses through the government to gain public control—commercial broadcasting was already so deeply entrenched, that the Radio Act of 1927 provided only for weak state interference. The state granted the licenses but left the stations free to choose the channels. Again, the necessary regulations were made by the market. This period saw the stabilization of the national networks. During the Depression, due to a lot of the smaller companies collapsing, there was a drift toward larger corporations becoming involved in the program production of the national network. At the same time non-commercial broadcasting was badly undermined. The Federal Communications Commission had neither the power nor the inclination to interfere in commercial broadcasting.

Thus, at the end of the 1930s all elements that were to characterize American broadcasting could be found: "... the alliance of advertisers and commercial broadcasters, who dominated programming over national networks, an oligopoly of manufacturers making radio equipment, a weak, administrative type of federal regulation, and the widespread diffusion of receivers in American homes, where they served increasingly as centers for family life." As in the United States, Germany also utilized the model of wireless communication for the organization of the radio, and again it was the experience of World War I that pushed the radio. The British and American models also influenced Germany. The Reichspost, which had already been responsible for the wireless, seemed the appropriate institution to organize a public radio from which the industry was excluded and which distanced itself from direct political influence. The broadcasting system was financed through fees paid by the listeners. This system largely excluded working families from the audiences. Although the scope of the radio quickly increased (compared to the United States, the difference is not that great) it remained an upper class medium until 1933.

The hegemonic political discourse in the Weimar Republic was organized around a clear distinction between the state and (party) politics. Though the influence of the state—the Reichspost had the majority of votes in all transmission corporations—was clear, the state was considered as "neutral", beyond all "egoistic party interests". One might say that with the first broadcasting regulation Act from 1926 the idealist state philos-

opy had triumphed again. Broadcasting committees in which the societal groups were represented decided on the contents of programming. Practically, this construction left aside all left-wing parties as well as the trade unions. In contrast to the situation in the United States, German radio was organized and implemented from top to bottom, with clear state regulation and supervision from the beginning. Despite its claimed distance from party politics, the political programming propagated the official governmental positions, while critical voices were excluded by censorship. Only after 1928, with the great coalition, the radio opened itself to the social democrats, but four years later, Reichskanzler von Papen centralized and nationalized the broadcasting system, turning it overtly into a tool of the government. Six months later the Nazis found a medium most suited to their needs. With the Gleichschaltung some of the journalists were dismissed, partly for racial reasons, partly for political ones. The directors of the regional stations were replaced by dedicated members of the NSDAP. Reichspropagandaminister Goebbels made clear from the beginning that he regarded the radio as the "most modern and most important instrument to influence the masses, a true servant of the Volk working to unite the German people in a common vision." Besides the complete control over a centralized broadcasting system, the most important step was the introduction of the Volkspropfänger (people's radio set) by the Nazis. Already in the beginning of the decade German broadcasting industries had had plans for a serially produced, cheap device. Goebbels himself supported the big companies in their plans, and in April of 1933 twenty-eight companies signed an agreement to share the market in producing an inexpensive radio set. The government decided to exempt those buyers with low income from radio license fees and to induce them to purchase radio sets by implementing an installment regime. Without going further into details, the success of these combined actions was that the radio found its way into workers' households as well as into the rural regions. At the same time, the Volkspropfänger was imbedded in the Aryan discourse in shaping the Volksgemeinschaft and became one of the icons of modernity for the regime.

After the defeat of the Nazi regime and the end of World War II, German broadcasting was under the control of the Allied Forces. In the first months after the war, radio became the most important instrument of communication between the Allies and German society as newspapers did not exist. It was seen as a central tool in the process of reeducation and denazification. In the Western zones the rebuilding of public broadcasting mirrored the public service model of the United Kingdom, taking into consideration the parallels to the Weimar Republic and the knowledge of...
the entanglement of industry and Nazi regime and the economic situation in postwar Germany. This system was effective even though Adenauer’s government struggled to control the medium. In Eastern Germany, the SMAD (Soviet Military Government) and the German communists favored a centralist broadcasting model based upon the principles of party lines and shaping of socialist society. Thus the organization of radio was central to the communists’ attempts to create the socialist society and was affected by the cleansing waves in 1949/50 and 1952.23

Linking Hegemonic and Media Discourses: Inventing Citizenship, Community and Nation

Since the founding of the United States, Americans have worried about their social and ethnic cohesion. In the early 1920s, two generations of rapid immigration, industrialization, urbanization, and technological changes had widened the ethnic, social and cultural differences as well as the gap between huge cities and rural regions. The Depression at the end of the decade fueled these anxieties. The idea of the radio (and before radio, that of wireless communication) and later on television, contained the utopian imagery of a tool for social unification, and was perceived as a remedy against the threat of an opening of the social and cultural divides, not only by the intellectual elite but also by many listeners.

Central keywords in the intellectual discourses were the concept of community in an industrialized society where old bonds of personal relationship were transformed into rational impersonal interactions, and linked to it the imagined dichotomy between “crowd mentality” and citizenship, the latter being based on the competence of independent thinking.25 Whereas the intellectual discourses were underlined by a profound pessimistic attitude, the broadcasting unfolded these views in a different, more optimistic way. Again different partial discourses emerged:

1. The radio as educator of the citizens.
2. The radio as unifier of the classes and of blue- and white-collar workers.
3. Inventing the nation by the politics of good taste.
4. The radio as the ethnic unifier or a means of re-assessing white hegemony.
5. Unifying the society by the transformation into a consumer-community.

This was very different from the German situation, as I will show below, in that the broadcasters were dependent on their audiences and the industry. There was broad consent about the pedagogical potential of the radio, but the educational broadcasting stations, mostly run by universities and other tertiary organizations, vanished from the airwaves at the end of the decade. The national networks had to combine educational value with commercial interests, and as some of the programs became successful, the presumption that educational programs were unpopular was challenged in the late 1930s. Nevertheless Craig comes to the conclusion that the radio educators were unable to influence programming significantly.26 Instead the stations chose to inform listeners: The onset of the Depression and the New Deal gradually established the news as part of the programming, the worsening crisis in Europe and the threat by the Nazis demanded a bigger share (10 per cent in 1938–9).

In 1930, Merlin Aylesworth, head of NBC, declared that the radio presented an ideal way “to preserve our vast population from disintegrating into classes ... We must know and honor the same heroes, love the same songs, enjoy the same sports, and realize our common interest in our national problems ...”27 It is significant that Aylesworth chose the imagery of popular culture to re-create social cohesion as a common frame of reference. As Michele Hilmes argues, the self-imagery presented by the commercial stations as the “nation’s voice” was so successful that this became part of the hegemonic discourse.28 Between 1932 and 1948 the serial show Vox Pop, incorporated by NBC in 1935, traveled along in search of the “voice of the people.”29 Thus network radio explored the new mass-mediated national public, helping to reshape national identity along with constructing the average American in a consumer society based on consensus. By doing so, the broadcasters explored the borderlines, and produced and readapted codes of exclusion and inclusion. Being on the show and the listeners’ ability to identify themselves with the performing voices became pivotal in the process of shaping the audience and the nation.

In the early radio days racial issues did not seem to concern American radio – until the war the broadcasting programming relied heavily upon traditional cultural forms, thus reaffirming white hegemony. The first truly national hit, The Amos ’n’ Andy Show, which swept the country in 1928, was transported from minstrel characters into the radio and created a new world eagerly shared by most listeners.30 Partially because of the positive impact of the show, it triggered a sometimes-turbulent debate among Afro-Americans, exploring the representations of black from a white perspective. Despite the fact that one of the pleasures of the show for whites came
became a model, a lot of the black bands and orchestras as well as actors from its racial voyeurism, the perception was multifaceted; as Susan Douglas shows, there was a renewed fascination with black English and many catch-phrases of the show found their way into the everyday language of the listeners.  

Ironically, when the serialization of *Amos 'n' Andy* became a model, a lot of the black bands and orchestras as well as actors were replaced by white musicians and performers. These were the years when Swing got white, and when the representation of the negro as a “simpleton” and so forth became the stereotype in the media until World War II.

Only with the onset of the war did anxieties about national cohesiveness lead federal officials to foster a broader notion of inclusiveness for the sake of national unity. One of the results was the production of a national broadcast series *Americans All, Immigrants All*, which was based on a narrative construction of success of immigration of African-Americans and Jews in an Anglo-Saxon nation. For the African-Americans, this series opened the possibility to pursue their political issues of inclusion and freedom on radio. During the war the race question became crucial for the War Department – but attempts to construct radio programming around the discourse of racial unity were thwarted by Southern conservatives in Congress. At the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War Afro-Americans took advantage of the international spotlight on the country’s policies of segregation and racial discrimination: programs that tackled racial issues were transmitted by national broadcasting although they simultaneously promoted white voices on racial questions. Only two local stations – one in New York City and the other one in Chicago – redefined the dreams of freedom and equality of the Afro-Americans, by using black voices on the airwaves. Thus it was in and by the radio that the construction of race relations was reassessed, introducing equality and freedom as the crucial issues. Here the intertwining relations between mass media and the political discourses came into view.

Any discussions on the close relationship between politics and mass media must include the “fireside chats” of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Roosevelt not only became the first political star of the radio age, but the New Deal’s publicity campaign used the radio as an important instrument in promoting the President’s policies. The range of Federal Agencies Network Programs was wide and combined educative, entertainment and political functions. But the best propagator was the President himself. Roosevelt not only possessed a radio voice but became a radio persona. In his chats he created a sense of intimacy, referring to himself in first person and addressing his audiences familiarly as “you”. Thus he made use of the essence of the radio, which blurred the borders between private and public, transporting the outside world into the domestic sphere and creating a broadcast intimacy even between the President and the listener(s).

As already mentioned above, broadcasting in Germany was invented along the dominant lines of a culturally conservative discourse in which the needs of national cohesiveness were used as a defense against the threat by political parties’ impacts. The cultural anxieties in Germany – seen against total defeat in World War I, revolution that swept away the Emperor, and inflation, reflected the deep moral, cultural, economic and political crisis, and were much more traumatizing to Germany than to the United States. At the core of the culturally conservative discourse in Germany was the fear of masses and of modernity, both identified with Americanization and democracy. Referring to German-ness as a cultural nation with its classical heritage and to the German *Geist*, seemed a remedy against the threats of mass-culture and Anglo-American civilization. These debates were written into the early history of the radio.  

With the approval of many politicians and broadcasters, the German pioneer of broadcasting and state secretary for the radio, Hans Bredow, praised the new media as an educational tool, which “helped to keep the adolescent children in the house and away from the ruinous impacts of the streets and the pubs”. Unlike the American case, educational programs such as lectures, as well as classical music and literature played a large role in the programming, especially in the evenings. The common understanding was that the radio should promote the education in citizenship (*Staatsbürger*) by imparting high culture to the listeners. In the view of Carsten Lenk, listening to a radio-concert, was similar to going to the opera; families got dressed up, and listened to the concert from home, inviting friends over. Popular music radio entertainment was mostly banned from the waves; classical music as well as lectures were dominant until the late 1920s. Thus the radio in Germany reaffirmed the ideals of the *Bildungsburger* (educated classes).

To shape the new *Volksgemeinschaft*, a term that was widespread in the cultural conservative discourse and by no means an invention of the Nazis, radio programming was made relevant to the different regions, thus mirroring the basic principle of its structure. Fostering the dialects, folklore music and various representations of regional culture meant not only a rejection of the urban mass culture – only sports were an exception – but a return to an organic prehistoric cultural unity of German-ness, shaped by the Germanic tribes. At the end of the decade, with the great economic crisis, radio programming enforced this imagery of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, so when the Nazis took over, they underlined the concept of *Volksgemeinschaft* by their racial anti-Semitic discourse.
Inge Marszolek

The Nazis, however, especially Reichspropagandaminister Goebbels, not only understood the radio as the most powerful instrument of propaganda, but were also fully aware of the potential and character of the medium. Thus, Nazi broadcasting not only kept jazz – in the smoothened tunes of white swing – in its programming until 1937, but developed genres of entertainment programs that took over American and British models in combining music and comical sketches, and so forth. Older forms of comical imagery, mostly gendered jokes, were adapted in these programs. As far as we know, they were mostly designed along the lines of regional differences, unifying the German tribes into the organic Aryan Volksgemeinschaft beyond and above class and citizenship.

Radio played a very active role in constructing and representing the Volksgemeinschaft. The simulation of being present and taking part in the emotional setting on stage of the Nazi community, was enforced by the role the broadcasting played within the central events by which the regime celebrated itself; for example on the occasion of the first Nazi May Day celebrations in Berlin, the radio covered the event with a 24-hour broadcast, and the speeches of Goebbels and Hitler on the Tempelhofer Feld in Berlin were transmitted by public loudspeakers to the marching masses in all towns and villages.

The discourses of racial exclusion and anti-Semitism were marginalized in the programming: focusing on the setting of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft those who were excluded, did not have a voice. Anti-Semitism was dealt with in lectures, but Jews were not represented on stage, were excluded as listeners (from 1940 onwards) and as existing persons. Unlike the print media, which dealt regularly with racial politics, not only against the Jews but, during the war, also against the Russian Untermensch, the radio refrained from presenting the enemies of the Volksgemeinschaft. A good example is the request concert (Wunschkonzert), which became the most popular program during the war. The issue was to unify the home front with the warfront. Combining classical and popular music, anecdotes from the front, with announcements of the donations made by the women at home and transmitting the names of the new-born children to their soldier-fathers and thus to the nationalized community, it reconfirmed the Volksgemeinschaft from inside, without mentioning the racial enemies.

In contrast to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Hitler had a lot of trouble presenting himself on radio. His radio speeches were not as charismatic as his public speeches; therefore most of his speeches on radio were recorded public speeches. The Führer never tried to explore the potential of the medium in creating an intimacy between the audience and himself.

Radio Days

The transmitted speeches, both the recorded ones and the few he gave in the studio, mirrored the ideal of the National Socialist public as presented in an advertisement for the Volksempfänger: the Führer’s voice coming out of a huge device overwhelmed a mass of shapeless listeners.

Shaping new identities was on the political agenda of both postwar German states, where the radio took an active part in the discourses about the position in the Cold War. Whereas in the United States programming the Cold War was more or less the task of The Voice of America, all stations in both Germanies perceived the “other” as an enemy. Recurring themes in Western radio stations were the discourses on shaping a new identity between West Germans and refugees from Eastern parts by re-adapting the Weimar imagery of folklore of the German regions, re-defining Europe and the idea of the Occident by struggling against American pop-culture. The broadcasting of the German Democratic Republic was seen as a tool in building a socialist new society in direct contrast to Western decadence. The programming concentrated on the concept of ennoblement of the workers, which had been central for the workers movement in Germany from its beginnings in the nineteenth century. The unsolvable problem for the broadcasters in East Germany was to define “socialist entertainment” and to convince an audience whose listening routines had been shaped by the “Volksempfänger” those who were born during the war were now tuning in to the airwaves, which were crossing borders: There is a striking resemblance in the discourse on rock ‘n’ roll in East and West Germany and in the cultural conservative discourse of the 1920s.

Inventing the Audiences

In both cases the early audiences of radio were predominantly male. In the United States there were 15,000 amateurs who regarded the listening consumers condescendingly: “After you got tired of the broadcasting stuff – Com in with us and enjoy the real radio” was an advertisement in one of their periodicals. A new series of juvenile books “The Radio Boys” flourished in the 1920s. A whole series of magazines, instructing the radio fans, swamped the market. DXing, trying to get the most distant station, became a new sport to the young, white, male radio audience. Their vision of the radio as linking people (male) from one place in the United States to another in an interactive way was ended by business, but still marked a potential and a dream of every new medium. This was accompanied by
changes in the technology that enabled the radio to become a center for family entertainment.

Like the German discourse, broadcasters and manufacturers argued that radio listening would provide domestic harmony, reinforcing family life. Some insisted that housework and motherhood would again become attractive for women, for radio would make the housework into a "fascinating endeavor". Of course the advertisers became aware of the housewife consumer. NBC told its advertisers that because 70 per cent of women were not in paid employment, they were the purchasing agents of the nation. During the day the audiences were female. "Radio mindedness" became equated with femininity, but again the opinions about these female listeners were divided. Housewives used the radio more as an "occasionally apprehended background to the noise", than as a medium of information. Michele Hilmes describes how female audiences were desired and feared at the same time; "Desired because their participation was central to the basic functioning of the institution, especially as it was colonized by the program production departments of major advertising agencies, yet feared because they occupied a discursive space linked to threatening concepts of the irrational, passive, emotional and culturally suspect 'masses'."

In the radio programming women were addressed within the confines of their domestic sphere. Obviously, the commercial interests of women as consumers and buyers went hand in hand with the traditional pedagogical perspective on women. Another part of programming for the female audiences was the soap operas, which became very popular in the second half of the 1930s. The soaps contained traditional female images and representations and thus legitimated and reinforced these domestic values, but they also were subversive in presenting patriarchy. Albeit offering mostly romanticizing limited way-outs, they nevertheless opened the cultural shut-ins. Radio advertisers concentrated on white women as having the greatest purchase power, the programming focused on domesticity. Broadcasters and advertisers argued that women were not interested in news, politics or economics. With very similar arguments women were excluded from most areas in the radio itself. The female voice seemed not to be apt for the airwaves. Despite the intervention of Eleanor Roosevelt, who suggested hiring female news commentators, to make women listen to the news, the national networks virtually banned women from the airwaves.

After the war, with the need for radio to redefine itself against competition from television, the stations rediscovered the "radioactive housewife". Radio still was the better medium to catch the attention of housewives: "Among all advertising media, radio and only radio reaches people while they are at work... daytime radio reaches the housewife, the purchasing agent of America, during her business hours, and in her office. She is unusually alone, not distracted by other persons in the household. She hears one voice, her radio, while she works." Obviously one of the great attractions of radio was the ability to bridge the divide between rural and urban life. But the rural radio market lagged far behind the urban regions until the end of the 1930s: in 1938 only 35 per cent of rural American families had a radio compared to 73 per cent of urban ones. The national networks therefore put farm programming quite low on their priorities, and the farmers often rejected this sort of program. More successful were farmers' stations with a regional program thus helping to fortify a sense of community in facing their economic crisis. The local stations' programming did everything to make radio a viable and successful medium in farm households in addressing rural women.

The strong coalition between broadcasters and advertisers had to convince their audiences to tune in. The programming coming from the outside world had to be translated into infinitely varied private spaces. Thus the audience seemed to be the arbiter of the new culture of listening. Networks referred to the democratic culture of America constructing their audience around good taste, improving cultural standards by mediating between the middlebrow and high culture. Trying to maximize their audience, broadcasters embedded their programming in what they thought was the mainstream of good taste, political consent and shared values. Thus the radio enforced the discourses of cultural hegemony by inventing an audience that was offered some choices within the "American System". Other voices, politically radical parties and marginalized groups were excluded. Towards the African-American audience, radio presented an imagery that insisted largely on segregation and inequality. Even jazz, which introduced black culture to the white majority, was programmed only at the request of listeners. Nevertheless it was the radio that made jazz popular.

Programming "good taste" in times in which anxieties about shattered masculinity were underlining the popular culture and public debates, did not prove easy. The confusion on the gendered order based on heterosexuality threatened the fragile relationship between the broadcaster, the advertiser and their construction of the audience. This was the reason why the sketch of Mae West on Adam and Eve triggered such uproar in 1937. Obviously, whereas the "lavender gentleman" was part of many a comical gag, the "untruly loose woman" was a danger for the consent between...
radio and its invented audience, and as this audience was partly imagined as female, she had to be banished from the airwaves.

Discourses about gendered audiences in Germany were very similar to those in the United States. Obviously there was no such widespread wireless movement in the early years of the radio as in the United States, because of state regulations, but with the appearance of radio, a much smaller movement started, which was already closely linked with it. The so-called Radiobastler (radio amateurs) were not only attracted by the new technology and had gained their knowledge during the war, but at the same time they avoided paying the fees, charged by the German postal service. These Radiobastler finally became an important part of the cultural workers' movement, seeing themselves in clear opposition to the bourgeois broadcasting that excluded communists and social democratic voices from the radio. Though the communist wing of the workers' radio movement in particular was highly critical of public broadcasting, propagating the utopian ideas of Bertolt Brecht in his Radio Theory, it obviously never became real competition. Thus toward the end of the Weimar Republic the communist newspapers published the programming of the stations and referred to it in many articles.

With the transformation from the detector to valves, radio entered the domestic sphere. Broadcasters and manufacturers discovered the female audience; the radio was advertised as a piece of furniture, easy to handle even for women. Located in the pedagogical and moral cultural conservative discourse, the housewife again comes into view. Radio was declared the domestic friend (der Hausfreund), but given the ambivalent meaning of Hausfreund (the lover) in German, radio was also perceived as a danger for women.

Male critics emphasized the importance of correct listening, which was described as concentrated listening, as male attitude, whereas women were listening in a distracted way, doing their domestic work. As a result "radiotisme", a sort of female illness, was discovered, which meant excessive, distracted listening. Special programming for female audiences was developed, mainly educational programs, addressing the housewives and adolescent girls. The conservative women's movement had a big impact on the contents of the Frauenfunk. Nevertheless these niches offered potential careers for females in the broadcasting system as demonstrated by the example of Carola Hersel, who invented a special program for working girls. Beside these exceptions, female voices were excluded from the airwaves with very similar arguments to those used in the United States. Unlike the programming there, and unlike the movies, the radio in the Weimar Republic did not perform the anxieties caused by the crisis of masculinity and by troubled gender roles, but restricted itself to present women in their traditional domestic spheres.

The Nazi's broadcasting followed this line: Regarding the request concert, even in war-time, women were confined to the domestic sphere—conflicting with war needs, which required women to work in heavy industry. Only in popular songs, like the song in which the female tram conductor was praised, and in movies, were other images of women propagated. Especially in the rural regions, even in times of war, the central message of Nazi broadcasting was to reconcile modernity and mass-culture with the rural communities and their bonding to the families. In 1940 the painter Paul Mathias Padua presented a painting "Der Führer spricht". This painting served as an advertisement for radio salesmen as well as a poster to decorate shop windows. Padua showed a farmer's family, several generations, sitting inside a Bavarian house in front of the radio set, listening to Hitler's voice, which was placed above their heads, thus replacing the traditional statue of Jesus Christ (Herrgotts­winkel). As in the request concert, radio enhanced the meaning of the Volksgemeinschaft as a family that the Führer took care of in times of war.

In the broadcasting programming in the early German Democratic Republic the imagery for women's roles became more sophisticated. Despite the propagated equality of both sexes, the gender roles were complementary: men were responsible for building the socialist society, while women were to shape the socialist society in nice ways, for example women should accept their responsibility for moral values, and take care of the little things that make life comfortable, such as baking cake on May Day (Hörfolge aus unseren Tagen). In the early Federal Republic, the ideal of the family was re-formulated by the conservative Christian Adenauer regime as a refuge after the war and the Nazi damage to the morality of the German people, and a bulwark against communism during the onset of the Cold War. The daily programming addressed a female audience, housewives and working women in their role as mothers and housekeepers. The redefining of the family as the core of the postwar and post-Nazi society was also represented in the very successful quiz shows adapted from American broadcasting as well as in soap operas such as Family Hesselbach, where a middlebrow patriarchal family was set on stage. In both postwar societies the recurrence to traditional gender relations obviously served to calm anxieties about the future.
Conclusions

This very rough outline offers similarities as well as differences: The similarities exist in the discursive fields covering the medium, the responses to societal conflicts, gendering the audiences and the interaction between politics and the media. Obviously, radio became a hyper-national media on both sides of the Atlantic, as Michele Hilmes points out. The differences – besides the very obvious ones, which are rooted in different organization, different political systems, and different technological development – are sometimes hidden if we look much deeper and closer into the discursive strategies. But at this juncture I would like to concentrate on two issues:

1. The discourses on the new media.
2. Radio and entertainment.

The emergence of every new medium triggers debates about its potential. These discursive narratives can be divided very clearly into those underlying the utopian effects and those stressing dangerous influence on society. In the climate of cultural anxieties, politicians, broadcasters and intellectuals on either side of the Atlantic were both optimistic and pessimistic about the new media. So, in many ways, the partial discourses were quite analogous. But referring to the broader cultural, political and economic context, the hegemonic discourses and their impact on programming itself differed a lot.

Speaking of the radio as a virtual unifier of society, the commercial radio constructed its audience as a unified consumerist society, in which different agents were discovered, along with their competence and power in purchasing. Thus national networks tried to shape their representations along the lines of the imagined audience, excluding Afro-Americans as citizens as well as radical left-wing organizations. In Weimar Germany the public radio, being embedded in culturally conservative discourse, excluded left-wing culture and parties as well as Jews (there were Jews working in the stations, but not represented in the programming). This was done because they were seen as a threat to the hegemony of the Bildungs­bür­g­ertum as well as to German culture: Germany should be unified as an idealized organic community. At the same time, broadcasting was perceived as a pedagogical tool – which was rejected by commercial radio. It may be regarded as an ironic turn in history that in 1945 German radio again became a pedagogical tool, now in the hands of the Allies, an instrument for re-education and denazification.

In both countries, despite the differences, radio put itself beyond the reach of the radio utopians as well as of overwhelming political or economical influence. The medium aired its messages into the private rooms, so tuning in or out became a choice. Inventing the audiences was a risky enterprise and broadcasters, politicians, advertisers and consumers were all very well aware of this. Although the mass media transport hegemonic discourses and imageries, these narratives have to be negotiated anew. Radio in the United States was part of discursive strategies dealing with “good taste”. That means stabilizing the hegemony of middlebrow white culture. In Germany the notion of culture and Kulturnation had to be redefined after World War I. The German Geist had to be defended against Americanization and mass culture – from the 1920s to the 1950s. Thus broadcasters in Germany tried to re-enhance high culture using the radio. Only with the Nazis did these borderlines become blurry.

Goebbels, who certainly was well aware of the ambivalence of the radio as a propaganda tool – he emphasized the need for intelligent propaganda – attempted to provide good entertainment as well as to reconcile high and popular culture. Thus, popular music was aired into the domestic sphere as well as Beethoven, serving as virtual realms in the view and memories of many Germans against the impositions of the regime. Whereas the political speeches were transported into the public sphere, being visible parts of the settings of the Nazi propaganda, Goebbels used the mass media for acquiescence. In both postwar Germanies, broadcasters had to cope with the listening routines shaped by the Nazi regime, with their high standards in entertainment programming. At the same time, it was American popular music, jazz and later rock ’n’ roll, which became synonymous with the American way of life, with freedom and a consumerist democracy. German stations did not play this popular music: West German youths were listening to AFN and later to Radio Luxemburg. Again, this challenges our view on the democratic potentials of the media as well as its being part of the microphysics of power. Tuning in or out can become a crucial question. Decoding the messages of entertainment programming like soaps or Amos ’n’ Andy, the request concert or listening to rock ’n’ roll becomes an individual and collective agenda. The ear of the listener is not innocent – he or she is part of the microphysics of power.
Notes

3. See the commentary by Michele Hilmes.

11. I agree with Michaela Hampf’s objection that, in Foucault, society and media cannot be separated, but I do insist on a pragmatic level to speak of the media as transmitter between society and power. See the commentary by Michaela Hampf.
12. From a German perspective it is fascinating that American scholars are continuously tackling the field of perception of the media without any need to legitimize their approach – and with fascinating results. This is very different from German scholars. For a good example see Konrad Dussel, *Hörfunk in Deutschland: Politik, Programm, Publikum (1923–1960)*, Potsdam, 2002. In his introduction (p. 23) Dussel speaks of the difficulties to cope with the challenge of the Cultural Studies to fit the cultural practices of encoding and decoding in a media history.
16. Research should be done into whether and how the German broadcaster discussed Anglo-American systems.
17. Dussel points out that the revolutionary soldiers’ councils established for some weeks a “central directory for wireless transmissions (Zentralfunkleitung), and intended to build up an independent broadcasting system,” Dussel, *Hörfunk in Deutschland*, p. 37f.
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23. Dussel, Hörfunk in Deutschland, p. 244ff.
24. In the multi-layered processes of imagining communities and inventing identities, the mass media play an important role. It is quite disturbing that up to now scholars have more or less neglected this part. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London and New York, 1991; see also Eric Hobsbawm, The Inventions of Tradition, Cambridge, 1992.
26. Ibid., p. 216.
27. Quoted in Lacey, Radio in the Great Depression, p. 29.
35. Lenk, Das Dispositiv als theoretisches Paradigma der Medienforschung, p. 57ff.

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36. Dussel makes this a crucial point. He entitles his chapter on the radio programming in the Weimar Republic: "Broadcasting for the educated classes," Hörfunk in Deutschland, p. 145ff.
37. Von Saldern, Rundfunkpolitik, p. 71ff.
38. In the Weimar Republic, jazz was marginalized in the programming. The question is whether there was more jazz and swing on the Nazi airwaves than before. See Michael H. Kater, Different Drummers: Jazz in the Culture of Nazi Germany, Oxford, 1992.
40. David Bankier has pointed out in a paper, that this is the same for the weekly newsreel. Up to now, the interpretation whether these findings prove the thesis that anti-Semitism was not deeply rooted in the society and the regime preferred not to deal openly with it, or whether the reason are differences in the media themselves, is still an open question.
43. A comparison between the radio performances of Father Coughlin and Adolf Hitler might be an interesting project.
46. Quoted in Czitrom, Media and the American Mind, p. 73.
47. Quoted after Craig, Fireside Politics, p. 244.


59. Uta C. Schmidt, "Der Volksempfänger," in Marszolek and von Saldern (eds), Radiozeiten, p. 150.


61. Schildt, Moderne Zeiten, p. 255ff.